Our research focuses on selected accountability mechanisms in the two countries. In Slovakia these are the Supreme Audit Offi ce (SAO) and the Ombudsman. In the UK, at the national level we chose the Committee of Public Accounts (PAC), the National Audit Offi ce (NAO) and the Parliamentary and Health Service Ombudsman (PHSO) and on the local level the relatively recently introduced local government system of Scrutiny and Overview.
Introduction
Public-service innovation is best understood as their development to better meet needs, by modifying the status of entities / actors in the system of public-service provision (Hartley 2005; Mulgan and Albury 2003; Osborne and Brown 2005) . Th ese entities are able and willing to learn, to improve their work and to cooperate with each other (Von Hippel 2007) . Such innovation must meet the needs of society or of a specifi c community whose members are involved in the process of creation and implementation of innovation.
Innovation of public services is possible in the environment of a new concept of government that is defi ned as the sum of interactions with cooperation of actors from the public and private sectors in solving social problems (Osborne and Brown 2005) . Th e emphasis is on the citizens and on building the civil society (Pollitt and Bouckaert 2011) . Th is means that for innovation in the public sector to be successful, there must be a consistency between the nature and the environment where innovation takes place. A successful innovation process requires legitimacy (Wilson 1989) , political sustainability (Moore and Hartley 2008) , strengthening democratic values (Bason 2010) and respect for the needs of citizens (Korteland and Bekkers 2008) . Public-sector innovation is social innovation that raises the economic, legal and democratic value of public services. Bekkers (2013) provides the framework for our research. He defi nes social innovation in its public-sector context and identifi es numerous potential drivers for and barriers to public sector innovation. Th ese drivers and barriers are grouped in three main dimensions: the innovation environment, the innovation process and the adoption of innovation.
Our research focuses on selected accountability mechanisms in the two countries. In Slovakia these are the Supreme Audit Offi ce (SAO) and the Ombudsman. In the UK, at the national level we chose the Committee of Public Accounts (PAC), the National Audit Offi ce (NAO) and the Parliamentary and Health Service Ombudsman (PHSO). To complement them we chose to study the relatively recently introduced local-government system of Scrutiny and Overview.
Th e goal of our article is to assess the potential contribution of these accountability arrangements to the anchoring of social innovation in the public sector (Figure 1 ) using the example of two diff erent countries: the UK -a developed country with a case-law system -and Slovakia -an EU country (in reality still a country in transition) with a continental law system.
Figure 1 Th e role of accountability arrangements in social innovations
Feedback loops (accountability mechanisms, such as ombudsmen and audit offi ces)
→ Organisational learning
Source, authors, based on LIPSE project results Th e general expectation is that accountability mechanisms such as ombudsmen and audit offi ces, if appropriately organised and well respected, can generate feedback loops which foster organisational learning. In turn these learning processes may increase the likelihood that innovations are anchored. Relevant research questions are:
• Which accountability and feedback mechanisms are in place, and how are they organised ?
• Do accountability bodies facilitate organisational learning ?
• If yes: are certain innovations institutionalised ? If no, or only to a limited degree, why is that ?
Research methodology
Th e research methodology is mainly based on qualitative methods and involved fi ve stages -choosing the reports for analysis, analysing the reports' contents, selecting cases for in-depth interviews, applying questionnaires and summarising results.
Choosing the reports to analyse involved fi nding reports that had clear recommendations for change. In auditing terms we were looking more for performance audits than for compliance audits. To test whether a recommendation has been implemented it helps if the recommendation is clear. But testing for implementation means that the report probably has to have been issued some years earlier. For even if an auditee agrees to implement a recommendation, immediate compliance may be infeasible. But the passage of time can also mean the audit team has disbanded and left the audit organisation, thus making it impossible for us to interview them. Th is prevented us from completing a second NAO case study.
Th e content analysis of the report helps to decide its importance for our purposes and can throw extra light on the issue of whether or not there is evidence of feedback loops between the two parties. It can also suggest policy changes that may encourage innovation by the auditee.
If the report is of some signifi cance and enough time has passed for a sensible evaluation of whether its recommendations were adopted, then we set about col-lecting detailed evidence about the relationship between the auditor and auditee using a very extensive questionnaire. Th is was achieved by face-to-face interviews or by email and telephone contact. Th e Offi ce shall audit the management of budgetary funds approved under the law by the National Council of the Slovak Republic or by the Government of the Slovak Republic, property, property rights, funds, obligations and claims of state, public law institutions, the National Property Fund of the Slovak Republic, municipalities, upper-tier territorial units, legal entities with capital participation of the State, legal entities with capital participation of public law institutions, legal entities with capital participation of the National Property Fund of the Slovak Republic, legal entities with capital participation of municipalities, legal entities with capital participation of upper-tier territorial units, legal entities established by municipalities or legal entities established by upper-tier territorial units, property, property rights, funds and claims provided to the Slovak Republic, legal entities or natural persons under development programmes or for other similar reasons from abroad, property, property rights, funds, claims and obligations, for which the Slovak Republic has assumed guarantee, property, property rights, funds, claims and obligations of legal entities carrying out activities in the public interest.
Key institutions
Th e Offi ce shall carry out audits with regard to compliance with generally binding legal regulations, the economy, eff ectiveness and effi ciency, and it may make recommendations to audited entities and to relevant bodies on how to deal with weaknesses and shortcomings identifi ed during the exercise of its competence -however, it has no right to decide about any fi nes. Th e authority to which weaknesses and shortcomings identifi ed by the audit have been communicated by the Offi ce shall be obliged, within the scope of its competence and within the time period specifi ed by the Offi ce, to ensure the removal of the identifi ed weaknesses and shortcomings and to submit, without delay, to the Offi ce a written report thereof.
Th e SAO is one of the most active Slovak CAF participants, and it received two national prizes for its quality-management system. Th e last fi nancial and HRM data about the SAO are provided by the 2012 yearly report. According to it, in 2012 the SAO employed 290 persons, 278 of whom were civil servants. Its 2012 budget was 7,785,243 EUR. Th e organisational structure consists of 6 sections (four auditdelivering sections, a section for economy and informatics and a strategic section), and the SAO has 8 antennas, one in each region.
Ombudsman of the Slovak Republic (www.vop.gov.sk)
Th e scope and scale of the rights and responsibilities of the Slovak Public Defender of Rights (Ombudsman) are defi ned by Article 151a of the Slovak Constitution. Th e Public Defender of Rights is an independent body that, in the scope and in manner laid down by a law, protects the fundamental rights and freedoms of natural persons and legal entities in proceedings before public-administration bodies and other public bodies, if activities, decision-making or inactivity of the bodies are inconsistent with legal order. In cases laid down by a law the public defender of rights can participate in calling to responsibility the persons acting in public bodies, if the persons have violated fundamental right or the freedom of natural persons and legal entities. All public power bodies shall provide the public defender of rights with needed co-action. Th e public defender of rights can apply to the Constitutional Court of the Slovak Republic for the commencement of proceedings according to Art. 125 if the fundamental rights or freedoms acknowledged for a natural person or legal entity are violated by a generally binding legal regulation.
In 2014 the Offi ce of the Ombudsman employed 28 civil servants; 24 of whom directly participated in professional investigations. It also employed an administrative staff of 12. Th e approved 2014 budget was 1,117,770 EUR, of which about 800,000 EUR were salary costs.
The UK National Audit Offi ce (NAO: www.nao.org.uk) Th e NAO is completely independent of government and is tasked with examining public expenditure on behalf of Parliament, to whose Committee of Public Accounts (PAC) it reports. Its head, the Comptroller and Auditor General (C&AG) has the right to examine and audit government and public-body accounts and is an Offi cer of the House of Commons. Neither he nor his staff of 822 (2013 -2014) , most of whom are accountants, is a civil servant. Th e NAO is overseen by a parliamentary committee, the Public Accounts Commission. Th is body appoints the auditors for the NAO and considers and presents the estimated expenditure requirements of the NAO to Parliament. It also appoints non-executive members to the NAO's board.
In 2013 -2014 the NAO certifi ed 427 accounts for 355 organisations, thus assuring £1 trillion of income and expenditure, and by its own account saving the government an estimated £1.1 billion. 67 % of audited bodies agreed that that the NAO "improves their approach to fi nancial management and control". It produced 66 Value for Money (VFM) reports and 4 reports on local services. Th e PAC held 60 hearings based on NAO work, and the government accepted 86 % of PAC recommendations Th e priorities of the NAO are to help government base its decisions on reliable comprehensive and comparable data, to improve its fi nancial management and to help departments better understand the process and costs of delivering their services. "We defi ne good value for money as the optimal use of resources to achieve the intended outcomes. Our role is not to question government policy objectives, but to provide independent and rigorous analysis to Parliament on the way in which public money has been spent to achieve those policy objectives" (http://www.nao. org.uk/about-us/what-we-do/value-for-money-programme/what-is-a-value-formoney-study?/ last accessed 27 January 2015).
In trying to achieve its priorities the NAO aims to use the best available techniques and, where appropriate, to be innovative approaching the investigations. Th ey may employ outside specialists, and an investigation generally takes from 3 to 12 months. Th e investigation commonly uses fi nancial and management analyses, document and literature reviews plus information from departmental and other staff , as well as from practitioners and service users, and benchmarking with other organisations at home or abroad. Th e full VFM cycle is consistent with the introduction and anchoring of social innovation in the public sector, which is summarised on the NAO website as follows:
• C&AG selects subjects to examine on the basis of advice from NAO teams.
• Th e study team scopes the study and plans what methods will be most appropriate to deliver the study's objectives.
• Th e study team carries out the study according to an agreed timetable and budget.
• Th e study team draft s a report including a conclusion on value for money and recommendations for improvements.
• Th e factual content of the report is discussed ("cleared") with the audited body.
• Th e report is laid in the House of Commons and published.
• Th e report is the basis for a hearing of the Committee of Public (PAC), which publishes its own report.
• Th e Government responds formally to the PAC report, indicating what it will do to implement the committee's recommendations.
• Th e NAO assesses what action has been taken in response to each of the PAC reports and where appropriate may undertake a follow-up study to scrutinise the response in detail.
Th e VFM process is itself subject to quality assurance through internal peer review and external independent expert review. Th e intention is that the fi nished review be the product of a robust methodology, and so has clear defensible conclusions, and that NAO will drive improvements in public service.
The UK Public Accounts Committee (PAC: www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-a-z/ commons-select/public-accounts-committee) Th e PAC was created in 1861 on the orders of the then prime minister W. E. Gladstone. It has long been one of the key scrutiny committees of the UK parliament. Because it was created to examine government fi nances it is logical that a Treasury minister sits on the committee. But by convention the minister does not attend its meetings, presumably to preserve the appearance of the penultimate auditee not infl uencing the discussion of a key auditor. Nevertheless the Government's responses to PAC recommendations are conveyed to the PAC in what are called Treasury Minutes. When the Minutes give the response they are both logically and sensibly framed as coming from the ultimate auditee, the Government, as in "Th e government agrees with the Committee's recommendation". Of course the government does not have to agree, and oft en it does not.
Th e House of Commons appoints the PAC to examine "the accounts showing the appropriation of the sums granted to Parliament to meet the public expenditure, and of such other accounts laid before Parliament as the Committee may think fi t" (Standing Order No 148) . Its focus is on VFM, and any attempt to consider how policy was made or question whether it should have been diff erent is vigorously rejected by the Treasury. Such questions are the concern of the Parliamentary select committees. As intended this prohibition is hard wired into the NAO's behaviour.
Th e PAC is a key part of the process of guaranteeing the transparency and accountability of government fi nancial transactions. To strengthen the rigour of the scrutiny by the PAC and to distance its public image from that of the government the convention is that the PAC is chaired by a senior opposition politician. Th e Committee is assisted by the Comptroller and Auditor General, who is ever present and available to give evidence at Committee meetings, and by his NAO staff . Th e NAO staff assist the Committee in preparing their reports and provide them with briefi ngs.
The UK Parliamentary and Health Service Ombudsman (PHSO: www.ombudsman.org.uk)
Th e ombudsman system in the UK dates from the 1960s and was loosely based on Scandinavian practices. Originally it was designed to investigate complaints of unfair treatment or inadequate service by UK central-government departments and some agencies. Access to its complaints mechanism was and somewhat controversially still is through a complainant's member of Parliament. In eff ect this means that the PHSO cannot conduct investigations into central government on its own initiative, and that weakens its power and eff ectiveness signifi cantly. Th ere is some pressure, not least from its present leadership, for complainants to have direct access to the PHSO, as they do for their complaints about the National Health Service (England). Th e NHS was added to the PHSO's remit in 1993 and now accounts for 80 % of its work.
In the PHSO's view its work is part of the administrative justice system and accountable directly to Parliament. Th eir investigation of people's complaints gives people a voice and some power. It can recommend how organisations should remedy errors and can ask them to produce action plans to do so. But although its decisions carry considerable weight it cannot enforce them. However, signifi cantly large or repeated issues can be reported to Parliament, which can hold them to account.
Th e Ombudsman's Annual Report and Accounts 2013 -14: A Voice for Change
reported that in 2012 -13 it had received 27,566 enquiries that had resulted in 2199 investigations, 49 of which were conducted jointly with the Local Government Ombudsman (LGO see below). It upheld 854 of the complaints. Its budget was £35 million, and it published 22 reports, including 6 with the LGO. It expected that by 2014 -15 it would have the capacity to investigate 4000 cases a year. By the end of March 2014 it had the equivalent of 427 full-time staff members. As it works jointly with the LGO we include a brief account of that organisation.
The UK Local Government Ombudsman (www.lgo.org.uk)
Over the last half-century the Ombudsman system has evolved by expanding to cover a wider range of areas of administration, oft en by the creation of new ombudsman positions covering more specialised areas of activity. Th e Local Government Ombudsman was created in 1974 and in 2013 -14 registered 20,306 new complaints and enquiries, of which 11,725 were considered, and 5680 of those eventually passed to an investigation team. Of those 70 % were dealt with in 13 weeks, 90 % in 26 weeks and almost 100 % within 52 weeks. 46 % of the complaints dealt with in detail were upheld and 60 % of the customers were satisfi ed or very satisfi ed with the service. Th e operating expenditure of the service in 2013 -14 was £12.2 million, and there was a staff of 161.
Since April 2013 the Commission has published all of its decisions, save for those where publication might reveal the complainant. Publication increases the transparency of the decision-making process and the accountability of the service.
Th e jurisdiction of the commission includes all local authorities except parish and town councils, police and crime bodies, school-admission appeal panels and many other bodies providing local services. Th e vast majority of complaints concern the decisions of local authorities. Central-government administration is covered by the separate Parliamentary and Health Service Ombudsman, although both ombudsmen sit on each other's committees and conduct joint inquiries where a complaint falls under both competences. Th ey are concerned to investigate mal-administration and injustice and to encourage appropriate remedies. "Although we cannot make bodies do what we recommend, they are almost always willing to act on what we say" (http://www.lgo.org.uk/about-us/ last accessed 28 January 2015).
From the viewpoint of the study perhaps the most interesting aspect of the Local Government Ombudsman's work is their focus on promoting best practice. Th is objective has been partly met by their recent decision to publish every decision they reach. Even more importantly, in 2013 -14 58 detailed reports of investigations were published because the cases involved issues of wider public interest. "By publishing such cases we seek to ensure that all local authorities apply the lessons to their own councils and learn from the experiences of people in one area to inform service improvement in another" (ibid.).
Overview and Scrutiny in UK Local Government
Overview and Scrutiny committees were established in English and Welsh local authorities by the Local Government Act 2000. Th ey were intended as a counterweight to the new executive structures created by that Act (elected mayors or leaders and cabinets). Th eir role was to develop and review policy and make recommendations to the council (Sandford 2014) . Current committees operating in England draw their powers from the Localism Act 2011. Other regions operate under diff erent legislation or, in the case of Scotland, no legislation, though many local authorities there have such committees.
In addition to committees scrutinising the operation of local administrations there are local-authority-managed scrutiny committees covering activities that lie outside the local authority's responsibilities. In England they have the power to scrutinise health bodies, crime and disorder partnerships, Police and Crime Commissioners and also fl ood-risk management bodies. In recent years the number of such scrutiny bodies has expanded, along with the policy to devolve powers away from central government. One such policy has been closing the Audit Commission, which dealt with local-government from April 2015 and local authorities are now free to engage private auditors. Some have argued that this strengthens the case for the creation of Local Public Accounts Committees to examine the whole range of publically fi nanced activities in an area, mirroring the national PAC. If such committees are created, and that is not the present government's intention, though it is the policy of the opposition, then there is a strong case for either extending the NAO's remit or creating a similar body to advise local PACs.
Before the Local Government Act 2000 local authorities conducted their business through committees or meetings of the whole council. Aft er the act all local authorities had to have at least one "scrutiny offi cer", though there was no provision to fi nance the post. Finance has remained a problem to the present day. While larger authorities were to introduce a range of scrutiny panels, district councils in England and Wales with fewer than 85,000 inhabitants could opt for a "streamlined commit-tee system" with at least one overview and scrutiny committee. With the passage of the Localism Act 2011 this option was extended to all English local authorities and many have reverted to the government by committee system. In Wales the Act mandated the opposite choice and required all councils to have either an elected mayor or a leader and cabinet system. Th e upshot of the Act and others covering Northern Ireland and Scotland is a great variety of local-government models across the country, as well as a range of scrutiny models.
Th e scrutiny system's structures and outcomes are thus varied and sometimes complex, which makes generalisation diffi cult. Th e Centre for Public Scrutiny (www.cfps.org.uk), an independent charity, has produced over 200 reports and other publications since 2004 and is a good source for research and for practical guides to accountability, transparency and involvement. It also produces good practice advice and give out the annual Good Scrutiny Awards, as well as less frequent surveys of the fi eld. Common problems are a shortage of resources, lack of access to information, insuffi ciently robust criticisms of leadership and senior managers who do not value scrutiny eff orts and evade challenges.
In Bath and North East Somerset (BANES), a local authority in the west of England with an estimated population of 178,000, the Overview and Scrutiny system is referred to as Policy Development and Scrutiny and is operated by six panels. Th is is our local-government case-study area for scrutiny. Th e panels are Th e panels' membership is drawn from elected councillors who are not Cabinet members. Th e "Overview" part of their remit is to help with policy development, comment on issues raised by the Cabinet, input into the early stages of major reviews of services and comment on draft budget and service plans. Th e "Scrutiny" activities include using performance-management information to check that targets are being met and action plans followed, to question certain Cabinet or offi cer decisions that have not yet been implemented, to check that certain Cabinet decisions are consistent with Council policies and plans and to evaluate the eff ects of Council or Cabinet policies and decisions.
Th e Overview and Scrutiny panels are thus not decision-making, but recommendation-making. Th ey can co-opt extra non-elected members for specifi c investigations and can engage the public in their work. But they do not deal with individual citizens' queries or with their complaints: these are handled by other council services. Neither do they cover regulatory or quasi-judicial decisions, such as planning or licensing. Finally there is a separate Health Scrutiny Panel that now operates under powers derived from the Health and Social Care Act 2012 to make recommendations to improve health-care delivery.
We investigated fi ve of the reports produced in recent years, gathering information from those who participated in their production.
Th e annual reports of BANES's Policy Development and Scrutiny panels are available at http://democracy.bathnes.gov.uk/ecCatDisplay.aspx?sch=doc&cat=13203&path=0.
Th e reports are collected in a review archive at http://democracy.bathnes.gov.uk/ecCatDisplay.aspx?sch=doc&cat=13202&path=0.
Th e review archive also contains the Cabinet's responses to the reports' recommendations. Th ese have to be delivered within two months of receipt of a report. On average a panel will produce a report about every eighteen months.
Do accountability mechanisms foster learning ?
We tackle this question by looking for evidence in the reports of the audit and scrutiny organisations whose activities were outlined in the previous section and in our questionnaires to those who worked on the audits or had knowledge of them. Unless otherwise indicated direct quotations are from questionnaire answers. We begin with two Slovak institutions and continue with the UK -the NAO, and then the PAC, PHSO and BANES PDS panels. We draw some fi nal conclusions in the next section.
Supreme Audit Offi ce, Slovakia
Th e Slovak SAO is a Common Assessment Framework quality-management-system user and has received several awards for its quality initiatives. Th e representatives of the SAO are very proud of the quality of its audit activities -an interviewed director felt that it performed excellently. However, the reality is very diff erent, as our research and also other sources indicate. Even the interview at the SAO revealed several major problems, especially:
• Before 2011 performance recommendations were not archived. Th is made tracing implementation diffi cult.
• Since 2011, although performance recommendations are archived, there is no system to trace implementation. So although reports may include important proposals, the SAO does not follow them up.
• Th e director feels very strongly that the SAO's role is that of a watchdog.
Our content analysis clearly documented that the SAO's auditors were not always fully qualifi ed to deliver performance audits. We were satisfi ed that although the SAO carries out in-depth investigations and selects the right cases, it does not always select the right criteria. For example, many offi cially mixed compliance and performance audits were really just compliance audits. When checking performance audits, or the performance parts of audits, we found a few excellent reports. But we also found some with major defi ciencies. For example the following quotes from two reports highlight the auditors' limitations:
"Th e city purchased cars for the lowest price. Th is means that economy, effi ciency and eff ectiveness are secured. " "For each audited university we randomly selected areas for economy evaluation. In UKF Nitra we found that there was no exact paper evidence of the presence of staff in their offi ces. " Th e main principles for communicating SAO fi ndings are prescribed by law. Draft reports must be discussed with the audited bodies at a joint meeting. Th e audited bodies must sign the fi nal protocol (with the right to record disagreements). Th e elected management bodies of audited organisations must discuss SAO reports at regular meetings. SAO reports are fully available to the Parliament, and the SAO also has a dedicated department for communicating with the media and the public.
Th e positive fi nding is that there is some potential for the establishment of learning loops -all the organisations interviewed indicated that the SAO proposals in our three selected cases were apposite and helpful. But only about ten of the more than one hundred performance reports we analysed had these characteristics.
Slovak Ombudsman
According to the relevant legislation noted above, the core role of the Ombudsman is acting upon a complaint of a natural person or legal entity or on his own initiative in cases when fundamental rights and freedoms were infringed, contrary to the legal order or principles of the democratic state and the rule of law in relation to the activities, decision-making or inactivity of a public-administration body. Th is legislative environment means that the main role of the Ombudsman has an ex-post character, and there are signifi cant limitations to the use of owninitiative investigations.
However, the Ombudsman also states on their offi ce's main website that their role includes improving public-sector functioning -so there is some space for innovative proposals:
"I wish the state would function for the people and in terms of the democratic principles of good governance. I consider it very important, and accordingly I would also like to markedly contribute to the improved operation of the public-administration bodies. I will devote my energy and time above all to making our country a really good place for life and to making people feel better here. "
JUDr. Jana Dubovcová, Public Defender of Rights Th e analysis of Ombudsman reports indicates that a part of regular and specifi c Ombudsman reports are recommendations. Most of these recommendations have basic defensive or organisational character, but some of them may serve as motivation for public-sector innovations. However, we have to mention that the Ombudsman does not have a suffi ciently pro-active communication strategy, especially concerning innovative proposals. All proposals are reported by two basic channels:
• annual regular reports -submitted to Parliament
• extraordinary specifi c reports on own initiative -with the right to move this document forward to be discussed in Parliament
Findings and proposals may but must not be discussed with bodies involved -all depends on the Ombudsman's decision (the Ombudsman also stressed that even in cases when she wants to discuss some issues, it is rather diffi cult to fi nd a real partner -especially the Ministry of Labour and Social Work is not open for any communication). One employee of the Ombudsman Offi ce is responsible for the contact with media, but the eff ectiveness of such eff orts varies case by case.
All fi ndings above indicate that there is relative potential for the establishment of a learning loop on the basis of the Ombudsman's recommendations. Th e Ombudsman is ready to serve in this direction, as our interview shows (our interviews with Ombudsmen seem to serve as the tool to strengthen this mechanisms), but a lot depends on the willingness of responsible public bodies.
National Audit Offi ce, UK
Th e fi rst report we considered was for the Ministry of Justice, entitled "Financial Management Report 2011" (http://www.nao.org.uk/wp-content/ uploads/2011/11/10121591es.pdf). Recommendation 1 suggests the need to improve the collection of fi nes, fees and assets under confi scation orders. Th ere is strong evidence of an eff ective feedback loop here, because aft er the Ministry accepted the need to act the NAO found signifi cant remaining problems and highlighted them in its December 2013 report on "Confi scation Orders". Th e Ministry then responded with further measures but "It is too early to know if this will provide a solution to the problem. " Th e NAO feels that Recommendation 2, to improve its accounting management process, has been dealt with satisfactorily.
Th e process by which the original NAO report was dealt with is worth noting. Th e PAC felt this value-for-money report was suffi ciently important to hold a hearing on it. Th eir report incorporated the NAO's suggestions and was accepted by the government in a Treasury Minute. Th e minute included a target implementation date. Th ere are publically available documents that describe the process and hearings and give the results at each stage of the process. Th is is a standard procedure. "Our conclusions and recommendations are published in reports that are laid in Parliament. Our reports are accompanied by press releases to alert the media to our work. We discuss our conclusions and recommendations with our clients and they form part of the Committee of Public Accounts hearing on the report. " We "want to off er expertise and respond to requests from the client … We do not generate media coverage in order to put pressure on the organisations being audited. "
We noted above that the NAO makes a bright-line distinction between investigating matters of administration and avoiding matters of policy. Th is distinction is mirrored in the work of the parliamentary committees. Th e parliamentary committee at whose meetings the policies of the Ministry of Justice are discussed is the Home Aff airs Select Committee, and it is interesting to note that the NAO also "engages" with this committee.
Th e NAO's view of its role on the spectrum "Watchdog -Advisor" is clearly the former. But it does try "to build productive working relationships with organisations to help drive benefi cial change. [For] we hold government departments and bodies to account for the way they use public money, thereby safeguarding the interests of taxpayers. [But] in addition our work aims to help public service managers improve performance and service delivery. "
Th e second report we considered was the NAO's report on the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Aff airs (DEFRA) "Managing Front Line Delivery Costs" (http://www.nao.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2011/07/10121279es.pdf). Our investigation involved collecting evidence from the NAO group that dealt with this ministry, and the general impression of the NAO's role and culture was consistent with that from the Ministry of Justice report. Th is report was less high profi le, and the PAC did not choose to hold a hearing on it. Th e Treasury Minute confi rmed the Government's acceptance of the recommendations and set out a timetable for their implementation. DEFRA informed the NAO that implementation had been completed by 31 March 2013.
Th e NAO informant reported their view of DEFRA's learning culture as "fairly tolerant" and their cooperativeness as "ultimately … high". Th e NAO undertakes what they call a clearance exercise when they agree all the key facts in their report with the client. "We also discuss tone and content where applicable. Th e Financial Director and Accounting offi cer both have an opportunity to comment. " Th is process is clearly in part aimed at building the good working relationship that will facilitate change, noted by our informant on the Ministry of Justice Report. However it is worth noting that the decision to implement change lies with government. Ultimately responsibility is political. Th is is a pattern that repeats across the institutions we studied.
Committee on Public Accounts, UK
Our report by this key audit organisation was their June 2014 report "BBC Digital Media Initiative" (52 nd Report of the session 2013 -14, HC 985). A second agreed study had to be abandoned because all of its authors had moved on from the PAC. Th e BBC project was an expensive failed-investment project. Th e BBC failed to use competitive processes before signing a contract that later had to be no-fault terminated. An anticipated £18-million benefi t was transformed into a £38-million loss. Th e NAO identifi ed very signifi cant management weaknesses, but its investigation was delayed for eight months by the BBC's refusal to provide certain data on grounds of fi nancial confi dentiality.
Th e NAO report was suffi ciently high profi le for the PAC to schedule a hearing, and the result was a report that recommended changes in the governance of major projects and improved arrangements for challenging project performance. Th e PAC informant confi rmed that parliamentary attention had helped produce a positive response from the BBC. Th e PAC to some extent tailored its recommendations to their feasibility, and the BBC response was characterised as a "good solution". As part of this agreement the Treasury Minutes make it clear that in future the NAO would have an enhanced role in accessing and assessing BBC data and performance. Th is would include access to confi dential contracts with third parties. Th e outcome thus involved signifi cant innovatory change that was anchored in the auditing culture of this independent public corporation.
Parliamentary and Health Service Ombudsman, UK
Th e investigated report was "A False Economy: Investigations into how People are Recompensed for Government Mistakes" (http://www.ombudsman.org.uk/ reports-and-consultations/reports/parliamentary/a-false-economy-investigationsinto-how-people-are-compensated-for-government-mistakes/10) Here the auditee was the Planning Inspectorate, and our informant works for them.
In 2010 the Planning Inspectorate was forced to look for savings because it faced a 35 % cut in its budget by 2014 -15. Th e cut amounted to £9 million. Th ey decided to drop an ad-hoc compensation scheme that they had previously operated to compensate people who had suff ered losses because of their mistakes. Th e annual saving would have been £250,000. Th e PHSO investigated a series of similar individual complaints and, realising that they had a pattern, issued a report that had a much larger potential audience than just the Planning Inspectorate.
Th e PHSO judgement was that "Th e Planning Inspectorate were acting contrary to HM Treasury guidance Managing Public Money and contrary to the Ombudsman's Principles when they decided that they would routinely refuse to pay compensation for the impact of their mistakes on users of their service. " Although PHSO did not specifi cally make the suggestion to the Planning Inspectorate, the latter decided to reinstate the original compensation scheme. In addition the PHSO, as it does for all its reports, issued a Learning Points document on its website, aimed at Permanent Secretaries -the most senior civil servants in ministries -, Boards and Senior Managers. Th e Learning points warn about the dangers of false economies and the importance of fairness and equity when cutting expenditure. Th ey urge these senior offi cers to consult the PHSO's Principles of Good Administration, Principles of Good Complaint Handling and Principles for Remedy when they are considering budget cuts. Th is was a timely reminder in the face of continuing and intensifying austerity.
Th e report directly resulted in a limited positive change and reinforced the importance of good communication across auditors and auditees. Th e PSHO clearly demonstrated its ability to eff ect change, and to generalise that change across its whole remit of organisations. Th ere is evidence of learning and the chance for innovation.
BANES Policy Development and Scrutiny Reports
We selected fi ve reports from four diff erent panels. Th ere were three participant informants, two of whom had served on two panels. Th e reports were: Here we try to give an assessment of the fi ve reports taken as a whole, particularly from the angle of learning innovation and anchoring change.
For four reports the Cabinet accepted almost all the recommendations, and if not accepted, a recommendation was usually just deferred. Th e informants were less likely than those at the national bodies we have already assessed to say that their recommendations were made with a view to their feasibility. However one noted that "Usually we have an idea from offi cers how Cabinet are likely to respond … but this does not change the process. " Th e remaining report was the Boat Dwellers and River Travellers Review. Th is was a very innovative review into the signifi cant minority community of boat dwellers who live on the rivers and canals of the area. Bath is unusual in having about one per cent of its population living on boats. Th ey face rather diff erent challenges to other householders. Th e review had 13 recommendations or parts of recommendations. Four were agreed, seven were deferred, and two were rejected. Th e problem of deferral was caused by the fact that some decisions will have to wait on river-safety improvements, and others were delayed because it was necessary to develop joint policies with other organisations with responsibilities for waterways. A new policy offi cer will be employed from January 2015 and this may help move forward the report's recommendations. Th e issues will need to be revisited in 2016 and 2017 and will require an evaluation framework to measure need and success, for example including families' state of health and access to schools.
Th e experiences of participants on the panels were generally positive. Our informants noted that Cabinet members were "very helpful and willing to cooperate at all stages" and they had "good working relationships and criticisms were taken seriously". Th ere was "respect" between the participants. However one informant noted that the level of tolerance was "Not great. It varies with the cabinet member, age and experience." But the panels felt they had some power because "Panels have an input into budgets, and that gives them some infl uence. Th e reputation of the chair is important, but how the reputation is perceived depends on both sides' personnel."
Getting a recommendation accepted depended on cost: zero-cost recommendations are more likely to be accepted. "Changes are linked primarily to budget, political impact and timing -nothing too drastic before an election !" It was clear that the panels have signifi cant potential to introduce small alterations and changes in administration, and even innovations as refi ned by LIPSE. But what comes through clearly from reading the reports and talking to participants is that lasting changes require updates. We have noted this for the Boat Dwellers report, but it is more widely true. For example the 2010 Home Care Review is an impressive piece of work. BANES had switched from council to private provision of home care some years earlier, and the Healthier Communities and Older People Panel, which had monitored the situation since then, set out to discover "whether the fi ve Home Care providers … are achieving the Council's stated objectives for the service. " An update on this review and its recommendations was produced in 2014, and a further update is planned for 2017. Such updating is a good indicator of the learning and anchoring potentials of the PDS panels' work.
What is the real impact of the accountability mechanisms on public-sector innovations ?
Th e Slovak information and responses from eight interviewed organisations do not provide a very optimistic picture of the level of implementation of SAO and Ombudsman recommendations.
Concerning the SAO, in only one case (the municipality Helpa) did the mayor state that all the recommendations were welcomed and fully implemented. But our own investigation suggested his assessment was too positive. For example the municipality does not have the data needed to assess the level of separation, and neither was such data part of the programme budget. In other investigated cases respon-dents mentioned partial or zero implementation. Th e main excuse was fi nancial constraints.
Another pertinent question is whether the SAO recommendations were the main, or at least an important, reason for changes. If we look at our cases:
• Changes in the public-transport system in Zilina were the result of EU-fi nanced project conditions, not the SAO report, which had no impact.
• Improved separation of waste on a municipal level is mainly the result of new stricter EU legislation, setting legal requirements for recycling. SAO reports might play some role, but they are not the dominant driver of change.
• Banovce's new heating system also cannot be directly connected to SAO recommendations. SAO reports might play some role, but again they are not the dominant driver of change.
Municipalities do not screen SAO reports as a source of new ideas and innovations. For them the SAO is a watchdog, controlling the detail of their actions -not a partner helping them to improve local democracy and local public services.
Taking a cost-benefi t view of the real impacts of SAO audit on public-administration innovation practice, we cannot be very positive. Of the several hundreds of reports we examined only a very few, including real recommendations with innovative potential, and in most cases this rather limited innovative feedback loop was neglected by the audited bodies.
Concerning the Ombudsman our research indicates that none of its innovative proposals are realised. To summarise, we conclude that the impact of the SAO and the Ombudsman on public innovations in Slovakia via eff ective feedback learning loops is rather limited because of the character of both institutions -perceived as controllers -and the general political environment, specifi cally the politicisation of the public-administration system. Th is last item is especially relevant in current Ombudsman cases.
For the UK this concluding section is partly summative and partly speculative. Th e summative part's message is to stress that there is a wealth of examples here of the fact that the UK audit, scrutiny and ombudsman system has very signifi cant learning, innovation and anchoring functions, potential and actual. Some conclusions are:
• Routine, repeated audits improve the chances of change, of anchoring change and the chances of discovering dysfunctional behaviour.
• Parliamentary attention and Council attention can drive change.
• Th e national bodies in this area are probably better than local ones at spotting and acting on the more general applications of a particular fi nding.
• Th e diff erent models of local government and local-government scrutiny suggest that there could be a wide range of responses across local authorities to the same problem. It is not obvious why such variation might be optimal.
• Being able to conduct joint investigations across organisations increases the scope of change. For example the Parliamentary and Health Services Ombudsman and the Local Government Ombudsman can conduct joint investigations. Th ere may be scope for considerable benefi ts with more inter-local authority joint investigations.
• Th ere is a strong case for allowing Ombudsmen to initiate investigations in any area of their competence.
• Th e more authorities and other organisations monitor and publicise change the better the chance of change and of anchoring it.
• It is worth noting that the UK system, at the central and top-tier local levels, reserves to politicians the decision power for adopting recommendations. Powerful audit, scrutiny and ombudsmen organisations make suggestions but ultimately defer to Parliament. Th e NAO may now get ready access to the BBC's fi nancial contracts, but only politicians will decide if the subsequent recommendations are adopted. It is consistent with democracy, but it is not the only way of managing such systems.
• Finally speculation -it is not clear that the "Watchdog -Advisor" distinction is going to be very productive in explaining learning, innovation and anchoring change, at least for the UK. Some of the key bodies, such as the NAO, see themselves as fulfi lling both functions simultaneously. If forced to choose they opt for "Watchdog", but their language, and especially the use of "client" for auditee, and their view of their dual functions suggests "Advisor" as well.
Possible reasons for the Slovak situation
We argued above that the impact of accountability institutions and mechanisms on public innovations that we observed to a signifi cant if limited extent in the UK is almost absent in Slovakia. We also argued that this absence might be due to the character and capacities of Slovak accountability bodies. In addition our research and other evidence points to additional explanations for the very limited quality of the Slovak innovations feedback loop. Th e explanations are:
1. A limited absorption (implementation) capacity on the part of addressed organisations.
2. A diffi cult Slovak environment, characterised by a lack of accountability and responsibility.
3. Th e over-politicisation of public life and the role of the media.
Absorption capacity
Th e problem of absorption capacity has several dimensions, but the most noticeable is territorial fragmentation. Local governments not only feel that the SAO and the Ombudsman are just controllers, but they also harbour doubts about the capacity of the SAO to control and advise, and about their capacities to improve and to implement interesting advice. Th is situation is the result of excessive fragmentation in local government. Slovakia has 5.5 million people but almost 3000 municipalities, most with fewer than 1000 inhabitants. Such tiny administrative units have problems handling the basic daily tasks of municipal life, and their internal innovative capacity and absorption capacity for handling external innovation inputs is close to zero.
Larger public-sector bodies also have only a limited capacity to absorb positive suggestions for change, as our cases show. Zilina, for example, has almost 100,000 inhabitants. Th e main reason is described below. Th e other issue is lack of willingness of municipal leaders to co-operate with other stakeholders (see Nemec et al. 2015 or Merickova Mikusova and Svidronova 2014) .
Accountability and responsibility
Th e second explanation -a problem specifi c to the CEE region -is their lack of accountability and responsibility. Th is has been well described by many recent studies -like Vesely (2013), Merickova and Stejskal (2014) , Kattel (2015) , Nakrosis (2015) , Ochrana and Hrncirova (2015) , Placek et al. (2015) and others. It is standard in Public Economics to argue that elected politicians may serve both the public and their own private interests (Stiglitz 1989) . In Slovak conditions the second choice is rather common -and rent-seeking offi cials do not normally deliver innovations to improve administrative and public services. Of course if the innovations are costly and fi rms connected to the politicians may benefi t, then that can change.
A study by Pavel (2009) clearly shows that because of their low level of accountability, Slovak public bodies frequently do not correct the mistakes discovered by SAO controls. And if such clearly emphasised errors are not rectifi ed, it is hard to believe that SAO performance proposals would be implemented.
Politicisation
Th e Slovak public sector is clearly over-politicised. Th e SAO and the Ombudsman are themselves interesting examples. Th e SAO is rather popular with the current and indeed also the previous government. Th e current SAO president's term of offi ce ended three years ago, and while it is Parliament's job to elect a new one, no political party shows any inclination to do so. We suggest that this is because it has been many years since the SAO initiated an investigation into any major top-level scandal.
On the other hand, the reputation of the SAO in the eyes of external experts is not very high. A lot of evidence for this is visible from our contents analysis and from our interviews. In 2012 the SAO was reviewed by Transparency International in a large project covering several CEE countries (Kostal et al. 2012 Th e scores for the auditors from interviewed representatives of the audited bodies were also quite low. All of them saw the SAO as a watchdog, so the auditors were not able to do their work on the basis of trust and understanding. Th e average mark from this group for the SAO's reputation in terms of credibility and expertise is 3 (with 7 as the maximum).
Th e Ombudsman's position is rather diff erent. During the interview the Ombudsman stated that:
"Political support can make Parliament more open to the suggested changes. "
Because the Ombudsman has criticised several actions of the current government, she is currently "persona non grata" for the governing coalition, which has a clear majority in Parliament. Th e fact that the Ombudsman did not receive space for her requested interventions in the programme of recent Parliamentary sessions is clear evidence of the current antagonistic relations between the coalition and the Ombudsman's offi ce (see, for example, Pravda, 30 January 2014: http://spravy.pravda.sk/domace/clanok/306921/). Th e Ombudsman also stated:
"Th e Public Defender of Rights is expected to be the eyes and ears of Parliament. (However) … Th e Public Defender of Rights is perceived by the institutions more like a control institution, and the primary reaction is to defend. "

Role of the Media
Th e media's role refl ects current society. Th e media are more willing to carry negative than positive stories. Th ey attract a larger audience. Th at is true almost everywhere. But Slovakia, unlike most other advanced societies, has no real investigative and independent daily or weekly papers. Indeed only two owners dominate the news scene. Th is situation was alluded to by the Ombudsman when they said: 
Conclusions
Th e theory anticipates that accountability institutions such as the SAO and the Ombudsman may create feedback loops supporting public innovations. We undertook detailed checks on the concrete situation in the Slovak Republic and in the UK. On the basis of the comprehensive set of data reviewed, including reports, interviews and more generally available information, we can confi dently conclude that while in Slovakia such a feedback loop barely functions, in the UK it does function on a limited but still signifi cant scale.
Th e several factors that determine the situation in Slovakia were briefl y discussed in the fi nal section above. To make the feedback loop operative in Slovakia there would need to be changes on many levels. In particular there would need to be improvements in the audit capacity of the SAO, less politicisation in the country's public administration and greater absorption and implementation capacities on the part of public bodies responsible for innovations.
Our article confi rms the general assumption that well working accountability mechanisms have good potential to support the innovativeness of the public sector. However, it also shows that in specifi c conditions where accountability and responsibility are not real public values, the public sector is over-politicised and media have "boulevard" character, this process may not occur. Th e case of Slovakia includes one extra specifi c feature -large fragmentation: Slovakia has 5.5 million people but almost 3000 municipalities, most with fewer than 1000 inhabitants. Such tiny administrative units have problems handling the basic daily tasks of municipal life and their internal innovative capacity and absorption capacity for handling external innovation inputs is close to zero.
